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Abstract—Detection of counterfeit chips has emerged as a crucial con-
cern. Physically-unclonable-function (PUF)-based techniques are widely
used for authentication, however, require dedicated hardware and large
signature database. In this work, we show intrinsic & database-free au-
thentication using back-end capacitors. The discussed technique simplify
authentication setup and reduce the test cost. We show that an analog-
to-digital converter (ADC) can be modified for back-end capacitor-
based authentication in addition to its regular functionality; hence, a
dedicated authentication module is not necessary. Moreover, since back-
end capacitors are quite insensitive to temperature and aging-induced
variations than transistors, the discussed technique result in a more
reliable authentication than transistor PUF-based authentication. The
modifications to conventional ADC incur 3.2% power overhead and 75%
active-area overhead; however, arguably, the advantages of the discussed
intrinsic & database-free authentication outweigh the overheads. Full
version of this article is published at IEEE TVLSI.
Index Terms—SAR ADC, Metal-oxide-metal capacitor, database-free
and intrinsic hardware security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Counterfeit chips are becoming increasingly common and have
emerged as a critical challenge for IC design and fabrication industry
[1], [2]. The current mainstream approach to detect counterfeit chips
is to embed a physically-unclonable-function (PUF) in the chips.
A PUF exploits process variability in design process and produces
an uncontrolled and unclonable signature. The output of a PUF in
each authentic design is stored in a database. Counterfeit chips are
detected by tallying their PUF signature against the database [Fig. 1
(a)]. However, PUF-based authentication has presented two critical
challenges: (1) A PUF with adequately large signature size requires
considerable area, power, and test overhead, presenting challenges for
resource-limited platforms and time to market. (2) With exponential
growth of electronic devices, maintaining and tallying against a
database of PUF signatures is unwieldy and even impractical for
certain applications [3].
Countering the above limitations of a PUF, an intrinsic and
database-free authentication was presented in [4]. Intrinsic authen-
tication discriminates authentic and counterfeit chips by exploiting
their design and fabrication discrepancies. In Fig. 1 (b), for intrinsic
authentication, a vendor not only ships an IC to a client but also
authentication characteristics (ACs) and their expected range of
output. ACs are designed such that there is a clear distinction
between authentic and counterfeit chips. For instance, if a counterfeit
chip uses an inferior foundry process or package to save cost
(maximize profit) then there will be discrepancies in path delays.
Likewise, an adversary pirating an IP may not be aware of the
exact layout or routing/placement algorithms/parameters of various
design components resulting in path delay discrepancies. Hence, path
delays can be used as an AC for authentication. In [4], an intrinsic
authentication based on the delay of non-critical paths in scan-chains
was presented.
However, ACs in intrinsic authentication should be carefully
chosen to minimize false positives and false negatives considering
process, temperature, and aging-induced variations. Fig. 2 examines
this using probability density function (PDF) for an AC in all
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Fig. 1: (a) PUF challenge-reponse pair database-based and (b) intrinsic
database-free authentication.
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Fig. 2: (a) PDF of a hypothetical AC in all ICs (fAC ) and in authentic ICs
(fAC|A), (b) Authentication failure at varying threshold bounds (TU − TL)
and variance of fAC|A. (c) Authentication failure at varying threshold bounds
(TU − TL) and covariance (ρ) of ACs.
(authentic and counterfeit) designs, fAC , and in authentic designs,
fAC|A. For authenticating thresholds TL & TU in Fig. 2, the authen-
tication failure AF is expressed for counterfeit (C) and authentic (A)
chips as
AF = P (C)× P (PassC ) + P (A)× (1− P (PassA )), (1a)
P (Pass
C
) = 1
P (C)
× (P (Pass)− P (A)× P (Pass
A
)
)
, (1b)
P (Pass) =
∫ TU
TL
fACdx, P (
Pass
A
) =
∫ TU
TL
fAC|Adx. (1c)
Considering a testcase of fAC = N (0.5, 0.1) and fAC|A =
N (0.9, 0.05) in Fig. 2(b), the variance in fAC|A limits the minimum
AF under the optimal threshold bound. The observation extends
to any fAC & fAC|A. Therefore, ACs showing a small variance
from chip-to-chip is necessary for reliable intrinsic authentication.
Additionally, multiple ACs can be combined to improve accuracy.
For example, an authentication test passes if at least m out of total
n ACs pass the test. In this case, authentication failure AF |mult is
AF |mult = P (C)×
∑
S P
(
Pass
C,AC1,AC2,...ACn
)
+
P (A)×∑S P( FailA,AC1,AC2,...ACn ). (2)
Here, S spans over all possible outcomes of AC1...ACn. However,
ACs must be uncorrelated to minimize AF |mult. For example, Fig.
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Fig. 3: Illustration of LER in MOM capacitor.
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Fig. 4: Variance of MOM capacitor (Normalized) as a function of (a) ηLER,
(b) σLER, and (c) S (spacing) × W (metal width) with L=5.8 nm, ηLER=16
nm for different σLER.
2 (c) considers a test-case with two ACs and accepting a chip if at
least one of the two ACs pass the test with fAC = N (0.5, 0.25),
fAC|A = N (0.9, 0.1) and co-variance ρ=0.5. However, in Fig. 2 (c),
if ACs are correlated, minimum AF |mult is limited. Considering
the above requirements on ACs in intrinsic authentication, this work
aims the following contributions:
• ACs with small variance: We discuss intrinsic AC based on the
standard deviation (σ) of unit back-end capacitances (Cu). Since
the back-end capacitances are insensitive to temperature and aging-
induced variations, and many unit-sized capacitances are typically
used (e.g., in a 10-bit capacitive DAC, 256 Cu are used), σ of the
unit capacitances can be reliably read for a low variance of AC.
• Low correlation to transistor-based ACs: Since the back-end
process steps are typically uncorrelated to the front-end steps,
the back-end capacitance-based ACs discussed here have low
correlation to transistor-based AC in [4]. Therefore, a combination
of ACs presented here with transistor-based ACs can enhance the
robustness of authentication.
• Low overhead AC extraction: SAR ADC architecture is modified
to allow signature extraction using back-end capacitors. Compared
to the conventional ADC, modified ADC requires 3.2% higher
power at the same frequency and 75% higher active-area.
The present work also extends our prior work [5] where we first
discussed the feasibility of intrinsic authentication using back-end
capacitors. In this work, we advance the design by considering energy
efficient monotonic switching SAR ADC architecture and by avoiding
additional parasitics in the signal path to minimize overheads. We also
discuss repeated sampling based signature extraction and optimization
of ACs for enhanced reliability.
II. PROCESS-INDUCED VARIABILITY IN METAL-OXIDE
-METAL (MOM) CAPACITORS
Poly-insulator-poly (PIP), metal-oxide-metal (MOM) and metal-
insulator-metal (MIM) are the most widely used back-end capacitors.
Currently, MOM capacitors are preferred over the others due to its
reduced cost [6] and easy customization for very small capacitances
for area/power-constrained designs. Therefore, we focus on MOM
capacitor-based ACs. Line edge roughness (LER) is the primary
source of variability in MOM capacitors [Fig. 3] and originates due
to inaccuracies in lithography process such as metal edge roughness,
limited resolution, random diffusion of acids, and intrinsic roughness
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Fig. 5: (a) SAR ADC architecture employing monotonic switching, (b)
Illustration Monotonic switching procedure.
of the resist used. Therefore, LER can be quite foundry-specific
depending on the process steps, equipment, and composition of the
process materials used in a facility. LER can be characterized by
standard deviation (σLER) conveying absolute roughness amplitude
information and correlation length (ηLER) conveying proximity of
the adjacent edges. We consider LER-induced variability in MOM
capacitance using Synopsys Sentaurus [7] based TCAD simulations
on a hundred capacitor structures. Fig. 4 illustrates the impact of
ηLER, σLER, and sizing on the variance characteristics of MOM
capacitors. From Fig. 4 (a), it can be observed that decreasing the
proximity of adjacent edges results in increased variance. In Fig. 4
(b), increasing σLER results in increased variance. Fig. 4 (c) shows
MOM capacitor variance at varying capacitor dimensions. Larger area
capacitors have smaller variance, in agreement with the Pelgrom’s law
[6]. In Fig. 4, if a cloned design (Fab 2) is fabricated using different
ηLER and/or σLER or is unaware of the exact capacitor dimensions
in the original (Fab 1), discrepancies arise in the capacitance variance.
III. ADC-BASED INTRINSIC AUTHENTICATION EXPLOITING
MOM CAPACITOR VARIABILITY
A. Brief Overview of SAR ADC Architecture and Operation
Conventional SAR ADC includes charge-redistribution capacitive
digital-to-analog converter (CDAC), comparator, and successive ap-
proximation logic. SAR ADC with monotonic switching to achieve
reduced switching energy has been proposed in [8], [9]. Fig. 5 (a)
shows the diagram of 10-bit SAR ADC architecture, where faster
reference settling is achieved by using downward switching. Fig. 5
(b) depicts the switching procedure. The input signal is sampled onto
the top plates of the capacitors while the bottom plates are connected
to Vref . Comparator performs the first comparison after the sampling
phase. Depending on the comparator output, the bottom plate of the
largest capacitor i.e, 256×Cu on VIP terminal is connected to the
ground if VIP>VIN , while the bottom plate of the largest capacitor
on VIN side is connected to Vref . The connections are reversed on
the two sides if VIN>VIP . Above procedure is continued till the
decision for the lowest significant bit (LSB) is obtained.
B. Authentication Scheme
1) Modified ADC architecture: Fig. 6 shows the modified ADC
architecture for intrinsic authentication using the back-end capacitors.
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Fig. 6: Modified SAR ADC architecture with authentication capability, Inset:
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Fig. 7: Circuit connections during signature extraction.
Our technique uses the fact that larger capacitances in a CDAC
are implemented using parallel combination of unit capacitances
(Cu). Such implementation reduces the overall mismatch of the
larger capacitances, but the mismatch in the unit elements cannot
be decreased or eliminated. The circuit modifications provide access
to each unit element forming a larger capacitor. Additionally, a
programmable offset capacitance (COF ) with COF ∼ σCu (σCu
is the standard deviation of Cu) is implemented at both ends of
comparator. COF is realized by connecting a programmable number
of capacitances in series in Fig. 6 where each small capacitance is
formed using lower overlap length.
2) Authentication characteristic extraction: AC in our scheme is
defined by the number NAC of unit capacitance pairs at the positive
and negative terminals of the comparator (i.e., Cu,P,i & Cu,N,i)
where Cu,P,i > Cu,N,i + COF or Cu,N,i > Cu,P,i + COF . NAC
characterizes the variance of Cu. Presently, only the unit capacitors
for the maximum significant bit (MSB) in CDAC are utilized for AC.
Signature extraction involves three steps: In Step 1, offset capacitance
COF is connected to the negative input of the comparator in Fig. 7 (i).
In Step 2, the top and bottom plates of all Cu in both MSB arrays and
COF are discharged to the ground [Fig. 7 (ii)]. In Step 3, one capacitor
from each MSB array and COF are activated by connecting their
bottom plates to ‘1’ [Fig. 7 (iii)]. The above procedure is repeated
for all Cu and the counter’s count is incremented if the comparator’s
output is one. After this, COF is activated at the positive input of
the comparator. The above steps are repeated and counter’s count is
incremented when comparator’s output is zero. The entire procedure
is repeated at varying COF to obtain the entire AC, i.e., NAC(COF ).
At the foundry, the above experiment is repeated with a significant
number of ICs to obtain multiple traces of NAC(COF ). From the
obtained traces, average trace NAC,AV G(COF ) and expected bounds
are determined and shipped to a client for intrinsic authentication.
C. Simulation Results
Circuits utilized to perform the simulation study are implemented
using 45nm technology [10]. MOM capacitor model based on [11] is
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Fig. 8: Comparator circuit diagram.
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Fig. 9: Quantitative analysis with (a) No repeated sampling, (b) Repeated
sampling, and (c) Impact on comparator input noise on mismatch characteri-
zation.
considered. Fig. 8 shows the circuit diagram of dynamic comparator
with PMOS input transistors. Outputs Outn and Outp are reset to
VDD when clk=0. Differential input pair compares the voltages at the
two input terminals when clk=1 and positive feedback action causes
the drain potential at either M1 or M2 to become high. Inverters are
used at the output stage for rail-to-rail output swing. Offset voltage
in a comparator arises due to process variations and is deterministic
in nature. Offset voltage can be reduced by using dynamic offset
cancellation techniques such as chopping and auto-zeroing [12]. On
the contrary, comparator input referred noise is indeterministic in
nature and is considered to have a Gaussian distribution profile with
zero mean and a variance of 250 nV2 in our simulations [13].
Fig. 9 shows the simulation results for NAC(COF ) normalized
against the total Cu pairs. Monte-Carlo simulations are performed
on a hundred designs. The impact of input referred noise is sup-
pressed by repeated comparisons for the considered capacitor pair
and taking the dominant comparator output as the final output.
Fig. 9 (a) shows the extracted distribution when repeated sampling
is not used. In Fig. 9 (a), AC bounds are wider since the input
referred noise dominates. Tighter bounds are achieved in Fig. 9 (b)
by repeated sampling. Fig. 9 (c) explains the shift in the average
trace of NAC(COF ) (NAC,AV G(COF )) under repeated sampling
in Fig. 9(b). In a Cu pair (Cu,P,i, Cu,N,i), the distribution of
Cu,P,i − Cu,N,i follows a Gaussian distribution. The comparator
identifies when |Cu,P,i−Cu,N,i| is more than COF . Since the density
of Cu,P,i − Cu,N,i decreases away from zero, a higher fraction of
capacitor pairs is falsely characterized to have a higher mismatch
than COF than the fraction falsely characterized to have a lower
mismatch due to comparator noise. Repeated measuring corrects this
inaccuracy which also results in NAC,AV G(COF ) moving to a lower
value. To perform authentication, NAC,AV G(COF ) and the expected
output bounds are stored. Authenticity of an IC is determined by
considering the Euclidean distance (DAuth) between its NAC(COF )
and NAC,AV G(COF ) and by comparing against the bounds. Notably,
unlike PUF, where the authenticating database grows with the number
of devices, the discussed scheme is database-free where AC test is
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Fig. 10: (a) Var(DAuth) vs Number of Capacitors (N) for different COF ,
(b) Mean(DAuth) vs Number of Capacitors (N) for different COF
the same for all devices.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the optimization considerations to
AC for the optimal number of capacitors to be utilized. Impact
of temperature and aging-induced variations on proposed technique
is investigated. Subsequently, resource overhead incurred due to
modifying conventional SAR ADC architecture has been discussed.
A. Optimizing Authenticating Characteristics
We optimize the discussed AC for the following objectives. O1:
Maximize the sensitivity of the authentication metric DAuth to the
variance of Cu. O2: Minimize the variance of DAuth (note that
DAuth = ||NAC(COF ) − NAC,AV G(COF )||). At a COF , NAC in
Fig. 9 is incremented if the following inequalities hold
(Cu,P,i + COF )× VREF∑N
j=1 Cu,P,i + COF
+ Vn(t) <
Cu,N,i × VREF∑N
j=1 Cu,N,i
, (3)
(Cu,N,i + COF )× VREF∑N
j=1 Cu,N,i + COF
+ Vn(t) <
Cu,P,i × VREF∑N
j=1 Cu,P,i
. (4)
Here, Cu,P,i & Cu,N,i is the ith capacitance pair at the positive
and negative terminals of the comparator, respectively. VREF is the
reference potential to charge the capacitance at the state ‘1’. Vn
is time dependent input referred noise to the comparator. N is the
number of capacitors used for AC. Various quantities in (3) & (4)
follow the distributions below
Cu,P,i ∼ Cu,N,i ∼ N (Cu, σ2cu), (5)
Vn ∼ N (0, σ2n), (6)∑N
j=1 Cu,P,i ∼
∑N
j=1 Cu,N,i ∼ N (N × Cu, σ2cu/N). (7)
Here, σCu is the standard deviation of Cu mismatch and σn is the
standard deviation of input referred noise. From (3-4), although using
a fewer number of capacitors (small N ) is statistically unreasonable,
using a very large number of capacitors also reduces the sensitivity
of the comparator’s output to the mismatch in Cu,P,i & Cu,N,i
and the output is dominated by Vn(t). Considering the probability
distributions in (5-7), Fig. 10 shows variance and mean of DAuth as a
function of N . In Fig. 10 (a), variance of DAuth reduces at higher N
and tighter bounds can be implemented for authentication. However,
in Fig. 10(b), sensitivity of NAC,AV G to ∆COF also decreases as
we increase N (shown mean(DAuth) traces at COF = Cu/50 &
Cu/100), imposing an upper limit on N . Trade-offs between Fig.
10 (a) and (b) determine the optimal value of capacitors (NOPT )
used for authentication.
The optimization for O1 can be further enhanced by using a
weighted distance of NAC against NAC,AV G at varying COF ,
DAuth,W =
√∑
i
ηi × (NAC(COF,i)−NAC,AV G(COF,i))2 (8)
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where DAuth,W denotes the weighted distance between NAC and
NAC,AV G, and ηi denotes the weight at COF,i. We assign ηi
proportional to the sensitivity of DAuth to COF (sensitivity =
∆DAuth/∆COF ). In Fig. 11 (a), DAuth is more sensitive to σCu
at higher COF . In Fig. 11(b), the reliability of the authentication
scheme is enhanced by performing such weighted analysis, where
DAuth,W exhibits higher sensitivity to σCu variations than DAuth
and improves the discernibility even at lower σCu .
B. Impact of Temperature and Process Variation
Discussed authentication scheme exploits process variations in
capacitors. However, variation of capacitance as a function of tem-
perature is undesired. The expression for capacitance as a function
of temperature is given below
C(T ) = C(T0)× (1 + TC × (T − T0)), (9)
where TC denotes the temperature co-efficient for capacitance
variation. Note that the temperature sensitivity of the back-end
capacitors is much less than in transistors. Additionally from (3-4),
the temperature dependence in our scheme is suppressed since the
signature extraction depends on the capacitance ratio which is even
less sensitive to temperature. In this context, we have studied the
impact of temperature variations on NAC,AV G (COF ). In Fig. 12
(a), NAC,AV G (COF ) is fairly insensitive to temperature variations.
Also, sensitivity analysis in Fig. 12 (b) (Temperature Sensitivity =
∆NAC,AV G(COF )/∆T ) shows that capacitance ratio based signa-
ture extraction is highly resilient to temperature variations, providing
reliable estimate of NAC,AV G(COF ).
Moreover, process variability in CMOS circuitry only has a second
order effect to the robustness of discussed authentication since the
authentication primarily depends on capacitors. We earlier discussed
comparator offset reduction using [12]. In Fig. 12 (c), we have studied
the impact of process corner variation in transistors of peripheral
circuitry on NAC,AV G (COF ). Additionally, sensitivity analysis of
the discussed scheme for different process corners computed as
∆NAC,AV G(COF )/∆Vth is shown in Fig. 12 (d). Global Vth
variations in transistors (especially in those used in comparator) does
not affect extracted signature NAC,AV G (COF ) significantly and
efficiently captures mismatch information from capacitors.
C. Overheads to the Regular Operation of ADC
Resource overhead in the modified SAR ADC arises as a result of
using additional inverters to access unit elements of MSB capacitor.
Further, control logic used for controlling signature extraction and
ADC operation leads to additional overhead. Fig. 12 (e) depicts the
HSPICE simulated switching sequence of conventional & modified
ADCs. Incorporated modifications preserve the switching sequence.
The conventional and modified ADC architectures can be reliably
operated at a maximum frequency of 205.2 MHz, thus, modifications
incorporated does not affect the maximum operating frequency. Fig.
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COF for different process corners, (d) Sensitivity Factor vs COF for different process corners, (e) Switching sequence of Conventional and Modified ADC,
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TABLE I: Comparison between PUF based authentication and our scheme.
Particulars RO-PUF Arbiter-PUF This work
Temperature Sensitivity 42.25% 68.83% 5.11%
Aging induced Variations 87.97% 66.34% 3%
Average Power (W) 3.83×10
−6 ×NINV s
per response bit
3.347×10−6 ×NDs
per response bit 696.13µ
Database-free X X X
Dedicated Hardware X X X
12 (f) shows the plot for power vs performance analysis where
modified ADC consumes ∼ 3.2% higher power than the conventional
design while operating at 205.2 MHz. Further, modified ADC has an
active area overhead of 75% when compared to conventional ADC.
Active area is computed by adding up L×W of all the transistors. It
should be noted that overhead can be further reduced by decreasing
N ; leading to simplified control logic design as well as reducing
number of additional inverters. However, this can critically degrade
authentication reliability.
D. Comparison between PUF and Intrinsic Authentication
Table I summarizes the comparison between PUF based au-
thentication [14, 15] and our scheme. PUF-based authentication
requires dedicated hardware and database of challenge-response pairs
(CRPs). Whereas our scheme is intrinsic and can utilize the existing
components (in this paper, an ADC) for authentication. In Table
I, the sensitivity for temperature and aging-induced variations in
PUF designs has been computed as percentage change in average
frequency difference (RO PUF) and average delay difference (arbiter
PUF) for 30oC change in temperature and 10% change in Vth of
transistors, respectively. Proposed scheme manifests better resilience
to temperature and aging induced variations compared to RO &
arbiter PUFs by relying on the back-end capacitors which are more
temperature/aging-insensitive than front-end components. Further,
power consumption in PUF scales with CRPs where the number of
CRPs depends on the number of on-field devices. Power consumption
of PUF in Table I is shown as a function of the number of inverters
(NINV s) in RO PUF & number of delay elements (NDs) in Arbiter
PUF decided by NCRPs [14], [15]. Meanwhile, the proposed solution
is database-free; hence, the power dissipation of the scheme is not
determined by the number of on-field devices. Thus, the proposed
scheme can better suit applications with a very large number of on-
field devices.
V. CONCLUSION
Mismatch in back-end capacitors is efficient source for authentica-
tion. In this work, MOM capacitor based authentication technique has
been proposed using SAR ADC to extract the signature. Proposed au-
thentication scheme does not require dedicated hardware as it utilizes
invariably present ADC block. Moreover, our scheme is database-free
unlike PUF based authentication. Discussed authentication scheme
achieves better reliability than transistor based techniques as back-
end capacitors are fairly insensitive to temperature and aging induced
variations. Additionally, power consumption in our scheme does not
depend on number of on-field devices, which is not the case with
PUFs. Although, incorporated modifications to the conventional SAR
ADC architecture incur 3.2% power overhead and 75% active area
overhead, advantages of our intrinsic and database-free authentication
can supersede overhead in many applications.
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